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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is a hot July day in Texas. You are minding your own business when, 
suddenly, the police knock on your door. You open it, speaking with candor 
and respect, to inquire about the purpose for their visit. Abruptly, you are 
handcuffed. Amidst your confusion and shock, you hear the officers mention 
things like “California” and “felon.” You are perplexed; the only trouble you 
had with the law was a lifetime ago, when felonious charges were entirely 
dismissed through a diversion program you successfully completed. Your 
neighbors are watching, and the embarrassment and shame already begin to 
rush through your body. 
It turns out the officers had no warrant to search you, and moreover, they 
were erroneous in their belief that you had a prior felony conviction. But, that 
is irrelevant, at least for now. You are booked into jail. You have seen enough 
television shows to know that you ought to get a lawyer, and you ask for ap-
pointed counsel, since money is tight and you cannot afford to pay for an at-
torney yourself. However, no one shows up that night to talk to you and hear 
you explain your side of the story. You spend the night in a cold cell, scared 
and alone. 
The next morning, you see a judge who tells you that while no formal 
charges have been brought against you yet, you still have a bond for $5,000. 
Again, the judge says you can hire an an attorney and request that attorney to 
come to court if you want, but it is an embarrassing reminder that you simply 
cannot afford one, especially on top of the price you are going to have to pay 
the bail bondsman. You keep telling anyone you can that there is no way you 
could have committed this crime because you do not have a prior felony con-
viction. Therefore, you cannot be charged as a prior felon in possession of a 
firearm–it is a logical impossibility. No one listens. 
While out on bond, you continue asking for a court appointed lawyer, since 
your financial status entitles you to representation by a public defender. De-
spite your persistence, you have not had any contact from counsel or the court. 
Six months later, just as you start to relax after the scare of the first arrest, the 
police show up again, and there you are, back in cuffs. A grand jury has re-
turned an indictment for the charge. It is the same routine: you sit in jail for a 
night, you see the judge and ask for a lawyer, and nothing happens. It is not 
until you have spent five more days in confinement and made another request 
that you are finally appointed an attorney. 
Then, finally, someone listens to you: you are not a felon. The public de-
fender with tired eyes and a briefcase filled to the brim with different client 
files uncovers the truth and presents it to the court. Finally, in late April, the 
charges are dropped for a crime you could not have conceivably committed. 
The hell is over, almost a year later. By legal standards, your name is 
“clean,” but in the court of public opinion, it is anything but. Your neighbors 
remember you being taken away in the cop cars, not once, but twice, and they 
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don’t look at you the same way anymore. You are quickly falling behind on 
your rent payments. Your marriage is strained. You cannot focus at work, 
which results in reprimands from supervisors and threats that you will lose 
your job. More than anything, you are constantly in fear that you will be 
picked up by the police at any time in any place all over again. 
While this sounds like a painful allegory warning us about the power of 
overzealous courts and mistaken identity, this story was reality for Walter 
Rothgary.1 Despite countless requests for representation by a publicly ap-
pointed attorney he was entitled to, Mr. Rothgery was held hostage by the 
court system for close to a year on a clerical error which was quickly resolved 
with finality and ease once his lawyer was properly assigned. This is an issue 
that would have been fixed within a day if Mr. Rothgery had counsel present 
with him at the initial bail hearing as he requested. 
An unanswered question under United States constitutional law is whether 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel extends to bail hearings.2 The Sixth 
Amendment, in part, provides: “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”3 
Based off of this text, it has become settled law in the United States that when 
facing any charge that might carry a sentence of incarceration, a person has a 
right to effective assistance of counsel, coupled with the right to be appointed 
counsel if he or she cannot afford to hire one.4 
Technically, this right attaches at a first appearance before a judicial of-
ficer.5 However, this guarantee does not necessarily mean counsel must be 
present at a bail hearing, commonly the first hearing involving a magistrate. 
Instead, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that once the right 
arises, “counsel must be appointed within a reasonable time . . . to allow for 
adequate representation at any critical stage before trial, as well as at trial it-
self.”6 
 
 1 Complaint at *1, Rothgery v. Gillespie County, (W.D.Tex. 2004) (No. 
A04CA456LY), 2004 WL 5470930. 
 2 See Alexander Bunin, The Constitutional Right to Counsel at Bail Hearings, 31 CRIM. 
JUST. 23, 24 (2016); GA. STATE UNIV. COLL. OF LAW CTR. FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE, 
MISDEMEANOR BAIL REFORM AND LITIGATION: AN OVERVIEW (2017), https://law.gsu.edu/f 
iles/2019/06/9.13-Final-Bail-Reform-Report-Center-for-A2J.pdf; Sandra Guerra Thomp-
son, Do Prosecutors Really Matter?: A Proposal to Ban One-Sided Bail Hearings, 44 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1161 (2016). 
 3 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 4 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970). 
 5 See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629, n.3 (1986); Brewer v. Williams, 430 
U.S. 387, 398–99 (1977). 
 6 Rothgery v. Gillespie County, Tex., 554 U.S. 191, 212 (2008). 
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The crux of answering this query is dependent upon whether a bail hearing 
itself is considered a “critical stage.”7 Unfortunately, the term “critical stage” 
has no clear or uniform definition in American jurisprudence.8 In the U.S., 
there is no recognized constitutional right to the presence of appointed counsel 
for the indigent at bail hearings.9 When state trial and appellate courts have 
tackled this issue before, there have been varied responses.10 In fact, only ten 
states in America uniformly provide counsel at an accused’s first appearance 
before a judicial officer.11 While a number of scholars are wrestling with this 
issue domestically12, this Note will consider the legal sources that provinces 
in Canada have considered in their journey toward mandated counsel for the 
indigent at bail hearings in order to provide further guidance and suggestion 
to future American court decisions. 
Part II provides a comparative background of the American and Canadian 
criminal justice systems, specifically focusing on the history of bail in both 
nations, as well as current approaches toward publicly-appointed counsel for 
the indigent and bail hearings. 
Part III includes an analysis of Canadian and American courts’ considera-
tions of what rights should be afforded to criminal defendants at the bail hear-
ing stage, primarily the current state of the mandatory counsel representation 
for the indigent at bail hearings. The current practices in each country will be 
compared against the source of law from which the right to publicly-appointed 
counsel is derived in each nation respectively. Additionally, this Note will 
compare the systems against one another to determine the legality of current 
practices, as well as the fulfilment of these practices to each country’s under-
lying values and goals of justice. This section goes on to identify the open 
legal questions that need resolution before mandated public counsel in bail 
 
 7 Id. 
 8 Paul Heaton, Sandra G. Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Conse-
quences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 774 (2017). 
 9 John P. Gross, The Right to Counsel but Not the Presence of Counsel: A Survey of 
State Criminal Procedures for Pre-Trial Release, 69 FLA. L. REV. 831, 840 (2018). 
 10 See Charlie Gerstein, Plea Bargaining and the Right to Counsel at Bail Hearings, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 1513, 1516 (2013); see also Douglas L. Colbert, Coming Soon to a Court 
Near You–Convicting the Unrepresented at the Bail Stage: An Autopsy of a State High 
Court’s Sua Sponte Rejection of Indigent Defendants’ Right to Counsel, 36 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 653, 658 (2006). 
 11 Douglas L. Colbert, Prosecution Without Representation, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 333, 345 
(2011). 
 12 See id.; Michael M. O’Hear, New Right-to-Counsel Rulings Address Bail and Waiver, 
MARQ. U. L. SCH. FAC. BLOG (Oct. 8, 2010), https://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2010/1 
0/08/new-right-to-counsel-rulings-address-bail-and-waiver/; Britta Palmer Stamps, The 
Wait for Counsel, 67 ARK. L. REV. 1055 (2014); Sarah Hook, Reality and the Right to 
Counsel in Maryland, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 29, 2011), https://www.brennancent 
er.org/blog/reality-and-right-counsel-maryland; Megan Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson, 
Bail Reform: New Directions for Pretrial Detention and Release, U. PA. FAC. SCHOLARSHIP 
(Mar. 13, 2017). 
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hearings can be affirmatively granted and make predictive assessments of how 
those questions will be answered, given court precedent in each nation. Fi-
nally, the analysis in this Note will highlight growing policy considerations 
from both nations and the impact those values have had in shaping growing 
trends or pilot programs relating to counsel for the indigent at bail hearings. 
Part IV concludes that in both Canada and the United States requiring pub-
licly-appointed counsel to criminal defendants at their first bail hearing is the 
best way to ensure fairness and equality in the legal system and to properly 
protect their constitutionally guaranteed rights. Further, if Canada and the 
United States were to implement this practice in tandem, the move would con-
stitute a huge stride forward for criminal justice reform worldwide and en-
courage other nations to take conscientious steps forward to protect the rights 
of the accused. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The History of Bail 
 
The concept of bail derives from Anglo-Saxon practices from the Middle 
Ages.13 However, money was not the original form of insurance for the 
courts.14 Instead, the custom during the 13th century was for a person to serve 
as the “surety.”15 In other words, criminal defendants were forced to call on 
friends, family, employers, or good-willed acquaintances of moral regard to 
ensure their bonds.16 
Three centuries later, the English Parliament passed the Habeas Corpus 
Act of 1679, “which, among its provisions, established that magistrates would 
 
 13 Kurt X. Metzmeier, Preventative Detention: A Comparison of Bail Refusal Practices 
in the United States, England, Canada and Other Common Law Nations, 8 PACE INT’L L. 
REV. 399, 401 (1996); see also Jacob Silverman, How Bail Works, HOW STUFF WORKS, 
https://money.howstuffworks.com/bail3.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2018); Bail, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990) (“Monetary amount for or condition of pretrial release 
from custody, normally set by a judge at the initial appearance. The purpose of bail is to 
ensure the return of the accused at subsequent proceedings. If the accused is unable to make 
bail, or otherwise unable to be released on his or her own recognizance, her or she is de-
tained in custody.”). 
 14 Stuff You Should Know: How Bail Works, HOW STUFF WORKS (Feb. 23, 2010), 
https://www.stuffyoushouldknow.com/podcasts/how-bail-works.htm. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id.; see also Burton F. Brody, Anglo-Saxon Contract Law: A Social Analysis, 19 
DEPAUL L. REV. 270, 275 (1969) (“The defendant’s appearance was guaranteed by placing 
him in the custody of his sureties. In this respect the procedural contract is the forerunner 
of bail bond systems. Although the typical procedural contract guaranteed both appearance 
and compliance, there were provisions for separate guarantees. The laws of King Edgar 
required every accused to have a surety to guarantee justice, and if the accused fled, the 
surety had to answer. A special provision applying to thieves is particularly akin to bail in 
that the surety was allowed twelve months to pursue the thief and recapture him.”). 
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set terms for bail.”17 The Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 was the first law to pro-
vide for monetary bail in lieu of another’s word. 18 With the enactment of the 
English Bill of Rights in 1689, further parameters were instituted by parlia-
ment in an effort to prevent excessive bail.19 
Bail is still a relevant part of criminal justice systems today in countries 
which derived from the British Empire, including England, the United States, 
and Canada.20 
 
i. United States of America 
 
After the American colonists gained their independence and began devel-
oping their new government, the Framers of the Constitution looked heavily 
upon the nearly century-old English Bill of Rights for guidance.21 This led to 
the young nation adopting an English common law judiciary system.22 Addi-
tionally, the United States’ Bill of Rights has a clear textual reliance on its 
British precursor.23 One need only look to the Eighth Amendment to find lan-
guage nearly identical to those words whose failed implementation was part 
of the powder-keg which sparked the American Revolution in the first place.24 
However, “American bail law is actually rooted in legislation.”25 The Judici-
ary Act of 1789, among other things, provided that bail was available for all 
non-capital offenses, and the setting of such bail was within the judge’s dis-
cretion.26 An important distinction to note when considered against its English 
roots is that at no time in American practice was personal surety a require-
ment.27 
 
 17 Silverman, supra note 13; Habeas Corpus Act 1679, 31 Car. 2, c. 2, § 2 (Eng.). 
 18 HOW STUFF WORKS, supra note 14. 
 19 Bill of Rights 1689, 1 W. & M. c. 2, (Eng.) (“[E]xcessive bail ought not to be required, 
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”); NCC Staff, 
On This Day, the English Bill of Rights Makes a Powerful Statement, NAT’L CONST. CTR.: 
CONST. DAILY (Feb. 13, 2019), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/on-this-day-the-english-
bill-of-rights-makes-a-powerful-statement. 
 20 Metzmeier, supra note 13, at 399. 
 21 Silverman, supra note 13. 
 22 William B. Stoebuck, Reception of English Common Law in the American Colonies, 
10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 393, 426 (1968). 
 23 NAT’L CONST. CTR., supra note 19. 
 24 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor exces-
sive fines imposed . . . .”) with Bill of Rights 1689, 1 W. & M. c. 2, (Eng.) (“That excessive 
bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punish-
ments inflicted . . . . “). 
 25 Silverman, supra note 13. 
 26 Marie VanNostrand & Gena Keebler, Our Journey Toward Pretrial Justice, 71 FED. 
PROB. 20 (2007); Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73; About Bail - History of Bail, PROF’L 
BAIL AGENTS OF THE U.S., https://www.pbus.com/page/14 (last visited Mar. 7, 2019). 
 27 Congress Reforms Federal Bail Procedures, CQ ALMANAC, https://library.cqpress.co 
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For nearly two centuries, statutory law and legal precedent relating to bail 
in the United States remained relatively dormant. However, an abrupt change 
came in 1966, when Congress passed the Bail Reform Act. 28 This piece of 
legislation “amended federal law to require the pretrial release of an individual 
charged with a noncapital federal offense upon personal recognizance or an 
unsecured appearance bond, unless the court determined they were likely to 
be insufficient to assure the appearance of the accused at trial.”29 In other 
words, Congress’ motivations in enacting this statute were to increase releases 
of defendants who were not significantly dangerous or at risk of flight, as well 
as to decrease the financial burden on the accused as much as possible. 
Congress passed an updated Bail Reform Act in 1984, replacing the 1966 
antecedent.30 This legislation rose out of fears that potential gaps from the 
earlier version were subject to exploitation at a risk to society: 
While the previous Reform Act had helped to overturn dis-
crimination against the poor, it had left open a serious loophole 
that allowed many dangerous suspects to receive bail as long 
as they didn’t appear to be flight risks. This new law stated that 
defendants should be held until trial if they’re judged danger-
ous to the community.31 
Moreover, the updated Act categorically identified individuals who were 
allowed to be held without bail (“[M]ostly those charged with very serious 
crimes, repeat offenders, the potentially dangerous and anyone who might be 
a flight risk . . . .”).32 Finally, Congress ensured through this statute that de-
fendants eligible for bail were entitled by law to a bail hearing.33 This marked 
the end of America’s modern bail-related legislation at a sweeping federal 









m/cqalmanac/document.php?id=cqal66-1302070 (last visited Sept. 28, 2019). 
 28 Bail Reform Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 214 (1966). 
 29 CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40221, BAIL: AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 3 (2017). 
 30 Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C.S. § 3142 (1984). 
 31 Silverman, supra note 13. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
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ii. Canada 
 
Since Canada’s earliest days, bail has been a matter of right for misde-
meanors and was discretionary for felonies.34 This rule came from British le-
gal precedents, which constituted the nation’s laws until the creation of the 
Canadian Confederation through the British North American Act in 1867.35 
The Act Respecting the Duties of Justices of the Peace, one of Canada’s first 
pieces of criminal legislation, “gave magistrates the discretion to grant bail 
for all crimes.”36 
In the 1960’s, Canadian Martin Friedland studied bail practices within the 
Toronto Magistrates Court, and his findings of “inequities in the application 
of the laws based on economic status,” coupled with other contemporary sen-
timents, “led to the appointment of a Royal Commission and subsequently the 
Canadian Committee on Corrections (CCC) to examine bail practices and to 
recommend reforms.”37 Notably, Friedland’s study was inspired by the U.S. 
Manhattan Bail Project, an early indication of an American-Canadian partner-
ship in support of criminal justice reform, specifically regarding bail policy.38 
The CCC in its 1969 report went on to make holistic and foundationally im-
pactful recommendations, including “that there should be a central registry in 
each province for the purpose of maintaining a record of those persons 
charged with indictable offences who are on bail so that this information 
would be readily available to the judge, magistrate, justice or police in con-
nection with a further bail application,” that an individual charged with the 
crime should have the presumptive right to bail unless “(i) It is made to appear 
that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused will not attend 
to stand his trial if released on bail, or (ii) It is made to appear that there are 
reasonable grounds for believing that the protection of the public requires that 
 
 34 Metzmeier, supra note 13, at 417. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id.; Act Respecting the Duties of Justices of the Peace, S.C. 1969, c 31. 
 37 Metzmeier, supra note 13, at 419. 
 38 The Manhattan Bail Project was implemented by the Vera Institute of Justice in 1961 
as a result of growing concern over the injustices presented by the current monetary bail 
system in place in the United States. Objective inquiries were led by a team of researchers 
to determine whether accused criminal defendants could be trusted to return for their trial 
dates without the surety of a monetary bail bond. During the project’s three years, 3,505 
accused individuals were released without any bail requirement, and only 1.6% of those 
people failed to show up for their trial date for reasons within their control. This experiment 
gained national support, including from the Department of Justice. Upon signing the na-
tional Bail Reform Act in 1966, President Johnson credited Vera and the Manhattan Bail 
Project as the catalyst for the legislation. See Jerome E. McElroy, Sentences Before Sen-
tencing: Introduction to the Manhattan Bail Project, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 8 (2011); JOEL 
L. FLEISHMAN, J. SCOTT KOHLER & STEVEN SCHINDLER, CASEBOOK FOR THE FOUNDATION: 
A GREAT AMERICAN SECRET 81 (2007); Manhattan Bail Project, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, 
https://www.vera.org/publications/manhattan-bail-project-official-court-transcripts-octo-
ber-1961-june-1962 (last visited Mar. 7, 2019). 
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the accused be kept in custody pending his trial,” and that bail should be based 
upon a defendant’s own recognizance, with a monetary surety only being im-
plemented when viewed as completely necessary to ensure later appearance.39 
Three years later, the vast majority of the CCC’s recommendations were cod-
ified for all provinces into the Criminal Code (§515-526) by way of the Bail 
Reform Act of 1972.40 
 
B. Criminal Justice Systems and Indigent Counsel 
 
Both of these common law systems derived from a British foundation, so 
it makes sense that the legal structures of America and Canada appear alike, 
especially from a criminal procedure perspective.41 However, this section 
aims to highlight the fundamental similarities and distinctions of the two crim-
inal justice systems, in order to serve as a backdrop to the rest of this Note’s 
analysis. 
 
i. United States of America 
 
In the United States, the criminal justice system encompasses two larger 
structures: the state and the federal level.42 The federal and each state govern-
ment have their own promulgated substantive and procedural criminal law, 
which is then enforced, adjudicated, and punished at the state or federal level, 
respectively.43  It is important to note for the purposes of future analysis and 
policy recommendations a major distinction between American and Canadian 
courts’ deference to international matters. Whereas Canadian courts will read-
ily consider international decisions and materials in reaching legal conclu-
sions, American courts are far more conservative and hesitate to give defer-
ence or cite non-binding, international materials.44 
Indigent criminal defendants are appointed lawyers since, “[u]nder the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the defendant is entitled to a lawyer in all 
 
 39 CAN. COMM. ON CORR., REPORT OF THE CANADIAN COMMITTEE ON CORRECTIONS 111-
13 (1969). 
 40 Bail Reform Act, S.C. 1972, c 37. (Can.); Criminal Code, ch. 51, 1953-1954 S.C. §§ 
515-526 (Can.). 
 41 Metzmeier, supra note 13, at 417. 
 42 Intro to the American Criminal Justice System, CORRECTIONALOFFICER.ORG, https:// 
www.correctionalofficer.org/us-criminal-justice-system (last visited Sept. 28, 2019). 
 43 James B. Jacobs, Criminal Justice in the United States: A Primer, 49 AM. STUD. J. 8 
(2007). 
 44 Peter Bowal, Ten Differences (Between Canadian and American Law), U. ALTA. 
LEGAL RESOURCE CTR. (2002), https://dspace.ucalgary.ca/bitstream/handle/1880/48043/B 
owal_Tendifferences2002_LawNow.pdf?sequence=1. 
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cases in which imprisonment is imposed.”45 The United States has a relatively 
liberal approach to a defendant’s right to fair representation at the trial level. 
For example: 
The right to counsel also encompasses other expert assistance 
if necessary for a fair trial. For instance, the Supreme Court of 
the United States has held that the defendant has a right to her 
own mental health professional to assist her defense in a case 
in which a serious insanity claim was being offered.46 
ii. Canada 
 
Canada’s criminal justice system has its own idiosyncrasies, while main-
taining a general resemblance to the American system. First, there are two 
prevailing legal traditions that operate harmoniously in Canada: civil law in 
Quebec and common law in the other provinces and territories.47 This is a co-
existence of law known formally as “bijuralism.”48 Moreover, the Canadian 
Department of Justice supports both official languages of the country (English 
and French) in its bijuralism efforts.49 
Next, the court systems of Canada are divided at a federal and provincial 
level, with distinct jurisdictions, much like in the United States.50 However, 
the Canadian courts are distinguishable in that there is not such a strict chasm 
of sovereignty between the local and national divide as in America: 
Provincial courts in Canada deal with less serious criminal and 
civil matters. All courts above are superior courts in the same 
system, all the way through the Supreme Court of Canada, the 
jurisdiction of which is binding on each court in the country. 
About half of all judges, and all those sitting on superior 
courts, are appointed and paid by the federal government. 
 
 45 Paul Marcus, The United States Criminal Justice System: A Brief Overview, WM. & 
MARY L. SCH. SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY 1, 6 (1996); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 
(1963). 
 46 Marcus, supra note 45; Gideon, 372 U.S. at 335. 
 47 Bijuralism and Harmonization, GOV’T OF CAN. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Sept. 18, 2017), 
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/harmonization/index.html. 
 48 About Bijuralism, GOV’T OF CAN. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.jus-
tice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/harmonization/bijurilex/aboutb-aproposb.html. 
 49 GOV’T OF CAN. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 47. 
 50 How the Courts are Organized, GOV’T OF CAN. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (July 27, 2017), 
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/ccs-ajc/02.html. 
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[There is] a small federal court that operates as one travelling 
court for limited federal matters.51 
Finally, criminal law, though codified as in America, is more streamlined 
in Canada. In other words, “being a criminal lawyer in Canada is easy because 
there is only one criminal law and procedure” adopted as federal law and ap-
plied in all of the country’s provinces.52 
Canadian courts do not recognize a general constitutional right to legal aid 
or appointed counsel for the indigent.53 Despite this holding by the Supreme 
Court of Canada, there are certain circumstances in which Canadian courts 
recognize the right for a publicly-funded attorney for a criminal defendant.54  
The Ontario Court of Appeal held in R. v. Rowbotham that “sections 7 and 
11(d) of the Charter do provide accused with the right to counsel in situations 
where lack of counsel would compromise their right to a fair trial.”55 
Nevertheless, Canada developed a system of legal aid in the 1970s based 
on a program instituted by the federal government, in which the provinces and 
national government entered a system of cost sharing.56 From there, the pro-
vincial level of government, which holds jurisdiction over the administration 
of justice, maintains the funding and delivers legal aid in cases of “young per-
sons facing proceedings under the Youth Criminal Justice Act,” the econom-
ically disadvantaged facing criminal charges with the possibility of incarcer-
ation, individuals in certain provinces falling under the provisions of the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, economically disadvantaged indi-
viduals facing terrorism prosecutions, and in federal prosecutions “where the 
Attorney General of Canada is ordered by the court to provide funded defence 
counsel.”57 Eligibility and specific services differ between provinces.58 
 
 51 Bowal, supra note 44. 
 52 Id. 
 53 ERIKA HEINRICH, LAWYERS’ RIGHTS WATCH CAN.,  CANADIAN JURISPRUDENCE 
REGARDING THE RIGHT TO LEGAL AID 1 (2013); see British Columbia (Attorney General) 
v. Christie, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 873 (Can.) (In which the Supreme Court of Canada held that 
“a review of the constitutional text, the jurisprudence and the history of the concept does 
not support the respondent’s contention that there is a broad general right to legal counsel 
as an aspect of, or precondition to, the rule of law.”) 
 54 Rowbotham v. Regina, [1988] O.A.C. 321. 
 55 HEINRICH, supra note 53, at 2. 
 56 Legal Aid Program, GOV’T OF CAN. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (July 3, 2018), http://www.jus-
tice.gc.ca/eng/fund-fina/gov-gouv/aid-aide.html. 
 57 Id. 
 58 GOV’T OF CAN. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 56. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. American Practices 
 
At the state level, whether an indigent individual receives a lawyer at the 
bail hearing currently remains a creature of statute or rule.59 However, there 
is discrepancy amongst the states. At this time, most states do not require the 
attorney’s presence at the bail hearing.60 
Currently, the federal courts require that an attorney be appointed in time 
to advocate during the bail hearing, but they do not necessarily require that 
attorney’s presence at that proceeding.61 
 
i. Sources of Law 
 
In order to better understand the questions facing courts in the United 
States today, it is necessary to analyze the sources of law from which a man-
dated counsel for the indigent at bail hearings would derive. First and fore-
most, the Sixth Amendment provides the right to “have the assistance of coun-
sel” in a criminal defendant’s case-in-chief.62 Beyond the Sixth Amendment, 
legal scholars have argued that additional underlying constitutional principles 
support mandating counsel at the bail hearing stage for indigent defendants.63 
Nearly 200 years after its ratification, the Sixth Amendment received its 
grandest interpretive expansion in Gideon v. Wainwright.64 This 1963 case 
resulted in the Supreme Court of the United States holding that “states have a 
constitutional obligation under the Fourteenth Amendment to provide Sixth 
Amendment lawyers to the indigent accused.”65 Although this right was ini-
tially presumed to only be applicable in felony criminal cases, the Supreme 
Court of the United States has gone on to hold that the right to appointed 
 
 59 See Bunin, supra note 2, at 23. 
 60 See id. 
 61 See id. 
 62 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 63 See Ginny Sloan, Pretrial Justice Demands Accused Have a Lawyer for Initial Bail 
Hearing, HUFFINGTON POST (July 20, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/ginny-sloan/ 
pretrial-justice-demands_b_7833294.html (“The right to counsel at first appearance pro-
ceedings underlies basic constitutional rights for our nation’s most vulnerable populations, 
including the assurance of equal treatment and due process.”). 
 64 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 65 Effective Assistance at Critical Stages, SIXTH AMENDMENT CTR., http://sixthamendme 
nt.org/the-right-to-counsel/effective-assistance-at-critical-stages/ (last visited Mar. 8, 
2018). 
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counsel for the indigent encompasses misdemeanors with potential incarcera-
tion, as well as misdemeanors with suspended sentences.66 
In 2008, the Supreme Court of the United States articulated that “the ques-
tion of whether the right to counsel has attached is distinct from the question 
of whether a particular proceeding is a ‘critical stage’ at which counsel must 
be present as a participant.”67 In other words, a defendant has a constitutional 
right to an attorney only when the right to counsel has “attached,” and the 
proceeding the defendant is facing is a “critical stage” of the prosecution.68 
This Note argues why a bail hearing definitively constitutes a critical stage 
later on in this analysis; however, for now it is important to take notice that 
“‘[a]ttachment’ occurs at the first formal, adversarial proceeding against the 
defendant, even if the procedure does not involve a prosecutor.”69 A bail hear-
ing, despite its frequency and (in some jurisdictions) casual demeanor, is in-
deed one of the first formal adversarial proceedings against the defendant.70 
Therefore, without engaging in the critical stage discussion, we can affirm that 
at least the first step of the constitutional inquiry regarding the right to coun-
sel’s presence—that the right to counsel has attached—is satisfied at a bail 
hearing.71 
Finally, in order to understand the basis for proposed remedies for a de-
fendant deprived of counsel representation at a bail hearing, this Note turns to 
United States v. Cronic.72 In this case, the Supreme Court of the United States 
held that there are two ways in which the right to effective assistance of coun-
sel (as established in McMann v. Richardson73) is violated: by actual denial 
of counsel and by constructive denial of counsel.74 This case further solidified 
that the absence of counsel at a “critical stage” of a defendant’s prosecution 
would implicate a presumption of ineffectiveness.75 Although intuitive, it is 
important to note that there is no valid claim of a Sixth Amendment right of 
effective assistance where no Sixth Amendment right to counsel is present.76 
Therefore, the remedy will not be available until courts recognize the legiti-
macy of the constitutional harm of depriving individuals of counsel at bail 
 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Gerstein, supra note 10, at 1514. 
 69 Id. 
 70 How Courts Work, AM. BAR ASS’N (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/gro 
ups/public_education/resources/law_related_education_network/how_courts_work/pre-tri 
al_appearances/. 
 71 Gerstein, supra note 10, at 1523 (“Bail hearings are sufficiently formal and judicial to 
trigger attachment of the right to counsel.”). 
 72 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). 
 73 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970). 
 74 Cronic, 466 U.S. at 648. 
 75 SIXTH AMENDMENT CTR., supra note 65. 
 76 Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586 (1982). 
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hearings. However, once the harm is recognized, the remedy will have sharp 
teeth, ready to bite at counsel’s absence from a bail hearing. 
 
ii. Open Questions of Law 
 
a. What is a “Critical Stage”? 
 
The requisite finding the Supreme Court of the United States needs to 
reach in order to create a mandated presence of legal counsel at the bail hear-
ing is to unequivocally define that proceeding as a “critical stage” of the de-
fendant’s prosecution, since “no critical stage in a criminal case can occur 
unless the defendant is represented by counsel or has made an informed and 
intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.”77 After Gideon was decided in 1963, 
the Supreme Court incrementally extended its ruling to guarantee indigent de-
fendants the right to publicly appointed counsel in misdemeanor cases and 
specific pre-trial proceedings that were considered critical stages.78 Over the 
next decade, the Supreme Court developed two strains of methodology that 
dominate critical-stage analysis doctrine.79  While the ultimate question rests 
upon “whether denying counsel at a given stage has the potential to work an 
unfair outcome at the ultimate criminal trial,” two cases that reached the high 
court portray two different ways to frame the analysis.80 The pathway devel-
oped in 1967 when the court decided United States v. Wade is “whether coun-
sel is necessary at the stage to secure the defendant’s trial rights.”81 Six years 
later, the Court shifted its perspective in United States v. Ash, considering 
“whether counsel is necessary because the stage is sufficiently trial-like and 
tricky.”82 
The slow march toward the indigent’s right to counsel came to a sudden 
halt in 1974 with the Supreme Court’s decision in Gerstein v. Pugh, where it 
was held that there is no constitutional right to representation for an initial 
probable cause determination.83 Despite this denial, the Supreme Court of the 
United States has never implied that there is a cap on which events can be 
considered critical stages, and they have explicitly held that the following de-
finitively fall within the “critical” category: “custodial interrogations both be-
fore and after commencement of prosecution,84 preliminary hearings prior to 
 
 77 SIXTH AMENDMENT CTR., supra note 65. 
 78 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Colbert, supra note 11, at 336. 
 79 Gerstein, supra note 10, at 1517. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id.; United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
 82 United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973); Gerstein, supra note 10, at 1518. 
 83 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). 
 84 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); 
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). 
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commencement of prosecution where ‘potential substantial prejudice to de-
fendant[s’] rights inheres in the . . . confrontation’, 85 lineups and show-ups at 
or after commencement of prosecution, 86 during plea negotiations and at the 
entry of a guilty plea, 87 arraignments,88 during the pre-trial period between 
arraignment and the beginning of trial,89 trials,90 during sentencing,91 direct 
appeals as of right,92 probation revocation proceedings and parole revocation 
proceedings to some extent.93“94 
On the foundation of the Wade and Ash methodology and exemplary pro-
ceedings already deemed critical stages, it seems likely that the Supreme 
Court of the United States should extend the category to encompass bail hear-
ings.95 In Rothgery v. Gillespie County, “[t]he justices’ responses during oral 
argument suggest that the narrow issue decided . . . could indicate that the 
Court is ready to consider . . .” bail hearings as critical stages requiring the 
presence of counsel for the indigent.96 
Regardless of how the Supreme Court chooses to frame the question today, 
a bail hearing would likely satisfy both the Ash and Wade methods, since the 
Court already recognized “[i]n today’s criminal justice system, . . . the nego-
tiation of a plea bargain, rather than the unfolding of a trial, is almost always 
the critical point for a defendant.”97 Empirical evidence indicates that “pretrial 
detention puts defendants at a profound disadvantage in plea negotiations,” 
since “approximately 17% of the detained misdemeanor defendants who 
pleaded guilty would not have been convicted at all but for their detention.”98  
By the Supreme Court’s standards, these plea negotiations at the bail hearing 
 
 85 Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970). 
 86 Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972); United 
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
 87 Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010); 
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970). 
 88 Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961). 
 89 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 90 Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); 
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 91 Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); 
Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198 (2001); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967). 
 92 Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605 (2005); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 
(1963). 
 93 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973). But see Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 
(1972). 
 94 SIXTH AMENDMENT CTR., supra note 65. 
 95 United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 
(1967). 
 96 Rothgery v. Gillespie County, Tex., 554 U.S. 191 (2008); Colbert, supra note 11, at 
335. 
 97 Ash, 413 U.S. at 300; Wade, 388 U.S. at 218. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144 
(2012). 
 98 Heaton et al., supra note 8, at 776. 
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stage made the bail hearing itself a critical stage because, under Ash, it became 
trial-like (entering a disposition), and under Wade, it made a potentially unfair 
impact to the ultimate trial stage since convictions were entered not for proof 
of guilt but for escape from detention.99 
Furthermore, in Coleman v. Alabama, “the Court concluded that an Ala-
bama preliminary hearing was a critical stage for reasons that could also apply 
to bail hearings.”100 In this case, the Supreme Court observed that preliminary 
hearings invite a defense attorney to “expose fatal weaknesses in the state’s 
case, learn about the allegations in order to prepare ‘a proper defense,’ and 
make ‘effective arguments’ for an early psychiatric examination or release”—
all viable advocacy postures counsel at a bail hearing can take as well.101 Cole-
man serves as strong precedent for the bail hearing as a critical stage argu-
ment, and stare decisis dictates that legal arguments of nearly identical con-
tours should receive judicial respect as well.102 
Persuasively, since the Supreme Court’s decision in Rothgery, both Con-
necticut and New York highest courts have held that bail hearings are critical 
stages requiring the presence of publicly appointed counsel for the indigent.103 
Trial and appellate-level state courts have made the same finding as well.104 
However, not all jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion. “Three 
states have interpreted Rothgery to not require counsel to be present at a de-
fendant’s pretrial release decision,”105 since the right to counsel does not at-
tach until after that decision is made, necessarily meaning the bail hearing 
itself cannot be a critical stage after the right to attach.106 Additionally, Ger-
stein v. Pugh appears to quash the issue at hand.107 In this case, the Supreme 
Court held that while “pretrial custody may affect to some extent the defend-
ant’s ability to assist in preparation of his defense, . . . this does not present 
the high probability of substantial harm identified as controlling in Wade and 
 
 99 Ash, 413 U.S. at 300; Wade, 388 U.S. at 218. 
 100 Heaton et al., supra note 8, at 775 (citing Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970)). 
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 102 Id.; Coleman, 399 U.S. at 1. 
 103 Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 223 (N.Y. 2010); Gonzalez v. Comm’r of 
Correction, 68 A.3d 624, 63536 (Conn.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 639 (2013). 
 104 See Ditch v. Grace, 479 F.3d 249, 253 (3d Cir. 2007); State v. Fann, 571 A.2d 1023, 
1030 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990); State v. Detter, 260 S.E.2d 567, 583 (N.C. 1979). 
 105 People v. Rojas-Ruiz, No. 2-14-1129 Il. App. (2d) LEXIS 141129-U (Ill. App. Ct. 
May 16, 2016); Ex parte Cooper, 43 So. 3d 547 (Ala. 2009); People v. Hurt, No. 301915, 
2013 WL 2120275, at *12-13 (Mich. Ct. App. May 16, 2013). 
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ACCESS TO COUNSEL AT PRETRIAL RELEASE PROCEEDINGS 1 (2016), https://www.ncsc.org/~ 
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 107 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 123 (1975). 
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Coleman.”108 However, since this decision was announced in 1974, there has 
been an expansion in relevant empirical data and qualitative research, which 
might provide helpful guidance to the Court in recognizing the true ramifica-
tions of bail proceedings.109 
 
b. Is There a Non-Constitutional Remedy? 
 
The final open question for American state and federal courts regarding 
mandated counsel at bail is how to remedy the harm caused by such a lack of 
representation. As previously discussed, should the Supreme Court of the 
United States finally acknowledge a bail hearing rightfully as a “critical stage” 
in the prosecution, the absence of counsel at a bail hearing would automati-
cally trigger a remedy through a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
under the Sixth Amendment as held in Cronic.110 Until then, it appears that 
individuals face a rocky, unpaved road in seeking relief. First of all, individu-
als are often unaware that it is their duty to request counsel at the initial hear-
ing, so typically this issue is not preserved if they have not explicitly been 
made aware of that right.111 Even if they have properly preserved the issue by 
requesting counsel at the initial hearing, relief is not guaranteed since some 
cases require a showing of prejudice when there is a claim of violation of the 
right to counsel.112 Moreover, “[a]ctual prejudice may be difficult to attribute 
because causation between pretrial detention and an unfavorable disposi-
tion—while statistically significant—is difficult to show in any particular 
case.”113 Therefore, constitutional litigation is very rare over the denial of 
counsel at bail hearings while still in the criminal trial or post-conviction ap-
peal stage.114 
There is a glimmer of hope for defendants who suffered as a result of a 
lack of representation at their bail hearings. Civil lawsuits featuring attacks on 
“systemic violations, not individual defendants appealing criminal convic-
tions,” have found more success within the legal system.115 However, these 
suits are often brought by third-party non-profit organizations like the 
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American Civil Liberties Union and state-run civil rights groups, whose lim-
ited financial resources and man-power make it impossible to provide advo-
cacy for all of those who are injured as a result of bail hearings without coun-
sel.116 While civil litigation has opened the door for vindicating defendants’ 
rights, it will continue to only serve as a limited proxy for the true constitu-
tional claims these individuals have a right to bring.   
 
B. Canadian Practices 
 
In the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, 
the Court recognized that “[t]he right of one charged with crime to counsel 
may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, 
but it is in ours.”117 Canada has grappled with its value of the fair processes 
of criminal prosecutions, while acknowledging that the nation has no consti-
tutional right to appoint such representation for the indigent who cannot afford 
representation for themselves.118 While certain pilot programs discussed later 
in this Note have implemented publicly appointed counsel for the indigent at 
bail hearings, most provinces require the defendant to represent himself or 
herself at the proceeding.119 
 
i. Sources of Law 
 
While the Canadian constitution does not provide the right to publicly ap-
pointed counsel for the indigent120, it does guarantee the right to not be denied 
reasonable bail without just cause.121 Further, although “[l]egal aid for needy 
persons in criminal matters in Canada is somewhat in the embryo stage at the 
present time,” there are legal sources to support the steadily increasing trend 
toward government-funded representation, specifically at the bail hearing 
stage.122 
The Supreme Court of Canada has yet to rule on this issue explicitly, but 
Ontario provincial courts have held that section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms (a bill of rights entrenched within the Constitution of 
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 117 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. at 344. 
 118 See Rowbotham v. Regina, [1988] O.A.C. 321. 
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Canada, drafted in 1982), when read in conjunction with sections 11(d) and 7, 
imposes the right to legal aid when doing so is essential to trial fairness.123 On 
the basis of this language, Canadian courts have delineated three factors which 
invoke the requisite representation of publicly appointed counsel.124 First, the 
accused defendant must not be able to afford his or her own representation, as 
determined through the presence of an affidavit.125 Next, the accused in the 
criminal context must face a threat to his or her life, liberty, or security of 
person, typically meaning a threat of jail time.126 Finally, the accused cannot 
have the ability to effectively participate in the hearing without the assistance 
of a lawyer.127 This is a subjective, context-specific consideration made by the 
court.128 Further, the province will only fund the defendant’s counsel in cases 
where doing so is “essential to trial fairness where the charges are sufficiently 
serious and complex.”129 Therefore, the court will consider the “accused’s 
age, intelligence, education and employment background, their ability to read, 
their communication skills and whether they suffer from any disabilities such 
as mental illness or addictions” in deciding if government-appointed counsel 
is necessary.130 All three of these predicates must be satisfied to trigger a pro-
vincially funded defense; if they are established, the right to an appointed law-
yer is constitutionally guaranteed.131  
Unfortunately, there is a major limitation in this legal analysis as applied 
to bail hearings. First, meeting these conditions does not constitute a right to 
immediate representation at the time of an arrest.132 More consequentially, 
courts have held that the right does not include a guarantee to counsel’s pres-
ence at all stages of a criminal prosecution.133 This is a major hurdle advocates 
must overcome in efforts to reach a mandated presence of counsel at Canadian 
bail hearings. 
However, certain precedents provide an optimistic view of rights of the 
accused in Canada. In Queen v. Prosper, the Supreme Court of Canada faced 
the question of whether “section 10(b) of the Charter imposed a positive con-
stitutional obligation on governments to ensure that free and immediate 
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2019] YOU MADE GIDEON A PROMISE, EH? 177 
preliminary legal advice is available upon arrest or detention.”134 While the 
Court ultimately decided there was no such constitutional right, it did find that 
in jurisdictions with duty counsel (lawyers paid by the provincial government 
who provide limited information, guidance, and advice prior to an unrepre-
sented defendant’s court appearance), if a duty counselor is unavailable at the 
exact time of detention, section 10(b) requires the province to “hold off” from 
inquiring for evidence from a detainee until he or she is present and availa-
ble.135 Notably, this decision did not imply these duty counselors were consti-
tutionally mandated; it only went so far as to decide that “the non-existence 
or unavailability of such services could, in some circumstances . . . give rise 
to issues of fair trial.”136 This case indicates the Court’s acknowledgement of 
the benefits of pre-trial legal assistance and the ramifications it can have on 
long-term trial results.137 Potentially burdensomely for this Note’s argument, 
the case also illustrates recognition of the Canadian Charter’s framers’ intent 
to limit interference with limited public funds by expanding these services 
beyond a manageable scope.138 
Furthermore, the potential for Canadian courts to take into account addi-
tional considerations for providing publicly appointed counsel is exemplified 
in Queen v. Hill.139 In this case, the defendant was charged with driving while 
intoxicated. Although he petitioned twice to receive the assistance of legal aid, 
he was denied both times.140 The defendant argued to the Ontario Court of 
Justice that although there was little chance a conviction at trial would result 
in incarceration time (as earlier mentioned, a necessary factor in obtaining 
publicly funded counsel in Canada), forcing him to go to trial without the as-
sistance of counsel would nonetheless violate his section 7 guarantees.141 In 
advocating for his position, the defendant argued that if he was ultimately 
convicted, the resulting criminal record would affect his ability to find a job, 
and the monetary fines would result in a “significant penalty” given his status 
as a welfare recipient.142 In reaching its decision, the Court held that “[o]ther 
factors in the right to counsel analysis should include the penalties, both 
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financial and social, that might result from conviction.” 143 Considering the 
social issues raised by the defendant, amongst the other Charter factors, the 
court decided that he was entitled to publicly funded counsel at his trial.144 
While this holding is obviously limited to the defendant’s request for coun-
sel at his actual trial, many of the social policy issues that persuaded the court 
on Hill’s behalf are applicable at the bail hearing proceeding. Hill raised con-
cerns of the stigma of a criminal record in searching for employment, as well 
as the compounded difficulties the poor encounter when saddled with further 
pecuniary punishments.145 Pre-trial detainment and decisions at the bail-hear-
ing stage of a criminal prosecution in Canada present all these same issues, as 
the Supreme Court of Canada recognized in Prosper.146 These two cases, in 
conjunction with the underlying principles of the Canadian Charter and values 
of the national system of justice, provide solid starting points, albeit limited, 
as sources of law in the quest toward mandated presence of counsel for the 
indigent at bail hearings from a constitutional standpoint in Canada.147 By 
leaning into these arguments, coupled with the success of provincial pilot pro-
grams outlined later on in this Note, Canadian attorneys (most likely Legal 
Aid counsel) have the potential to indicate that this movement requires recog-
nition of the importance of counsel at bail hearings so that there is no option 
but to recognize a right to legal counsel as a fundamental human right pre-
served in the Canadian Charter.148 
 
ii. Open Questions of Law 
 
The Canadian right to publicly appointed counsel is still in its infancy, so 
the question of when and where these attorneys for the indigent should be 
provided is still unclear, leaving the space for legal advocacy wide open. In 
shaping this discussion, the Canadian provinces will over time articulate 
clearer distinctions of providing or rejecting public counsel at certain stages, 
which will allow the seriousness of a bail hearing to take superiority in the 
necessity of presence of counsel for the poor, just as the United States has 




Canada and the United States have significant similarities in terms of ju-
dicial philosophy, movements in this area of criminal justice reform, and 
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specific legal analysis techniques. Studying these commonalities provides a 
strong basis when considering how the movements of one country can help 
shape the future of this issue in the other. 
First, and perhaps the most esoteric of the North American nations’ like-
nesses, both Canada and the United States have at their cores a recognition of 
the value of fundamental human rights. Looking at the constitutional language 
of both nations demonstrates a vested governmental interest in ensuring the 
protection of the most democratic and important rights of mankind: 
“We the people of the United States, in order to form a more 
perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, 
provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, 
and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our poster-
ity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United 
States of America.”149 
“Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the 
right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice.”150 
Beyond mirrored language and common democratic purposes, these doc-
uments demonstrate an underlying dedication to certain principles which 
shape the judiciary in each country. While this might seem like a somewhat 
insignificant and mysterious likeness to draw upon in making discrete legal 
arguments, such as that for mandatory presence of counsel for the indigent at 
bail hearings, it is from these texts which all legal arguments in Canada and 
the U.S. find their deepest, most impenetrable roots. It is from these texts, 
written by framers with near identical missions of heart and ideals despite over 
a hundred- year difference in authorship, from which small, incremental steps 
in the law derive. It is from these texts and this recognition of fundamental 
human rights that the right to publicly appointed counsel in certain circum-
stances was discovered in each nation. “Publicly-subsidized legal services for 
indigent citizens are considered a critical element of modern Democratic legal 
systems,” and, as both constitutional texts purport through augmented legal 
reasoning, “[s]ubsidized legal assistance is predicated on notions of funda-
mental fairness and on the principle that equality of justice is meaningless 
without access to justice.”151 It is from this belief, these documents, and these 
continually shaped legal theories that the extension to representation for the 
poor will be expanded to encompass representation at bail hearings in both 
countries. 
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Next, decisions already made by courts from both countries indicate an 
increased willingness to provide broader publicly appointed defense for the 
indigent. Like the United States, where case law has expanded the role of a 
public defender throughout the process of a criminal prosecution, Canada has 
made strides toward implementing greater protections for poor defendants, 
despite the lack of constitutional basis.152 Although the constitutional right to 
a public defender-like system was turned down in Crown v. Prosper, protec-
tions ensuring the presence of duty counselors, if made available by a partic-
ular jurisdiction, were upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada.153 This hold-
ing shows a willingness to broaden, however slightly, defendants’ rights in 
conjunction with publicly appointed legal aid.154 Additionally, the federal 
government in Canada provided $112 million to the provinces and territories 
in 2013 in order to support their provincially run Legal Aid programs, con-
tributing to the more than $823 million spent each year for these structures, 
92% of which comes from direct government funding.155 Although funding in 
the United States far surpasses this amount at an estimated $5.3 billion in 
2008, the amount of criminal cases prosecuted in the U.S. versus Canada 
demonstrates that Canadian governments are possibly spending more money 
per capita on indigent defense than the United States, given the population 
disparity between the two nations.156 This demonstrated fiscal commitment 
suggests that Canada takes the value of Legal Aid seriously in the same way 
that the United States does. Should Canadian advocates for representation at 
bail begin to fail in the courts, there is possibility for them to succeed legisla-
tively. 
Perhaps the most overt commonality between the two nations’ jurispru-
dence on this matter is the prospective arch of the analysis in determining the 
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appropriateness of representation by publicly appointed counsel. The courts 
of Canada and the United States alike focus not on the pre-trial proceeding in 
front of them in making such decisions, but instead they each consider the 
ultimate ramifications this particular moment could have on the ultimate trial 
outcome. In the United States, both the Ash and Wade methodologies devel-
oped by the Supreme Court turn on whether the stage at hand, without repre-
sentation, could result in a negative impact at the eventual criminal trial for 
the defendant.157 Similarly, as demonstrated in Hill and Prosper, a subjective 
inquiry into the defendants’ ability to represent themselves with a sufficient 
understanding of the legal complexities at a trial, coupled with a consideration 
of the non-confinement repercussions of a guilty conviction, exemplifies Can-
ada’s concern for the future hardships that could result from the disposition of 
a criminal case.158 
While these standards allow for incremental steps of cautious judicial ex-
pansion, as mentioned above, they both seem to miss the mark. These doc-
trines appear to enable a narrow vision of the issue at times, confining the only 
negative repercussions of a prosecution to the ultimate outcome. By these 
courts’ logic, a guilty verdict results in a defendant becoming shackled with 
the enormities and burdens of the criminal justice system, and a finding of not 
guilty means you walk away. However, the stories of any person who has 
found themselves an accused in a criminal case, including Mr. Rothgery, Mr. 
Prosper, and Mr. Hill, inform us that the financial, social, emotional, and men-
tal fallout began long before any verdict was announced by the court.159 
Canada and the U.S. are two countries which have endowed their citizens 
with enumerated rights through documents forged in iron pen.160 As two of 
the most sophisticated, developed, and fair criminal justice systems in the 
world, it is necessary for these legal communities to call upon their respective 
nations’ courts to ensure the tests used are truly just methodologies that pro-
tect the freedoms and liberties granted to each country’s citizens.161 Bail hear-
ings seem to be a natural next step for mandating representation, in both the 
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U.S. and also in Canada, when considering the embodying principles of the 
Constitution and the Charter, coupled with the temperament encompassed 
within the courts’ current jurisprudence in determining whether the presence 




The largest distinction between Canada and the U.S.’s potential for man-
dated counsel for the indigent at bail hearings is the lack of a basis in Canada’s 
Charter for the right to an attorney if you are too poor to afford one.162 This, 
admittedly, puts American proponents at a huge persuasive advantage in their 
advocacy. Even the most conservative courts in the U.S. will lend an ear to 
arguments that seem reasonably grounded within Sixth Amendment jurispru-
dence, since it is their duty to do so. Engaging in the critical stage analysis 
and persuading courts to find bail hearings encompassed within the category 
leads to the finding that there is a legally binding force extending the consti-
tutional right to a public defender to the bail hearing stage. At this time in 
Canada, the law does not appear ready to make such a transition with the same 
ease. 
Nevertheless, factors like the continued expenditures dedicated to Legal 
Aid, expansions of duty counsel programs, and shifts in the scope of the right 
to publicly appointed counsel demonstrate reasonable grounds for Canadian 
courts to continue making small incremental shifts toward the end goal. Ad-
ditionally: 
Although no court in Ontario (or anywhere in Canada) has 
ventured so far as to state that the right to counsel for indigent 
defendants is absolute, where the charges are serious and com-
plex, and an unfair trial would result if counsel were not ap-
pointed, the Charter-based right to a stay of proceeding until 
funded counsel is appointed, articulated in Rowbotham and 
successive cases, is built on a strong foundation.163 
This strong foundation shows a promise, despite the lack of constitutional 
backing, to continue to support expansions of the rights of the poor to publicly 
appointed counsel, including at the bail hearing stage in a criminal prosecu-
tion. 
A huge persuasive help for the Canadian judiciary would be for the Su-
preme Court of the United States to make a solidified standing on this issue. 
Just as bail reform in Canada was inspired by the Manhattan Bail Project, a 
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pronounced judicial stand on this issue, coupled with similar policy concerns, 
could serve as a stepping stone to Canadian holdings as well.164 
 
E. Policy and What We Can Learn from Each Other 
 
Today in America, millions of indigent defendants engage in bail hearings 
each year, and most do so without the presence of counsel.165 Of the 700,000 
people in jail every day in America, those awaiting trial account for 60% of 
the inmate population.166 Additionally, despite the decline of crime rates in 
Canada for decades, greater numbers of people than ever before are being de-
tained without bail, and these cases are taking longer to process.167 In other 
words, “less people are being released on bail, less quickly, and with more 
conditions, during a time of historically low and still-declining crime rates.”168 
While at a superficial level these proceedings can be seen as standardized and 
not a space where zealous advocacy is necessary, “a bad outcome at a bail 
hearing can force an indigent defendant to plead guilty,” in order to avoid 
sitting in jail when they cannot afford to post bail.169 This delay, which can 
last a handful of days or even months, irreparably affects a potentially inno-
cent defendant’s ability “to investigate, speak to witnesses, evaluate the 
charges in a timely manner, and prepare a defense.”170 This harm is not just 
speculative; there is empirical data suggesting that the absence of counsel has 
a definitive negative effect on pre-trial detainees.171 In fact, there is evidence 
showing that effective advocacy by a lawyer at a bail hearing is the single-
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most critical factor for a criminal defendant, particularly the indigent.172 In 
terms of proper judicial decision-making relating to pre-trial release, defend-
ants charged with misdemeanors and non-violent crimes are two and a half 
times as likely to be released on recognizance when represented by an attorney 
at their bail hearings. 173 This is likely because a lawyer will be able to “em-
phasize that a client’s limited financial resources impair his ability to pay an 
ordered bail amount, and instead point to factors that demonstrate sufficient 
trust to be supervised by a pretrial agent or receive an unsecured financial 
bond,” an argument many indigent defendants are unable to articulate on their 
own behalf, within the intimidating formalities of the courtroom.174 Those 
subjected to pretrial detainment suffer from a dramatically increased “likeli-
hood of a jail or prison sentence, increases potential recidivism, and decreases 
the chance for dismissed charges, an acquittal, or a noncustodial sentence.”175 
Additionally, in Canada, those who are poor or suffering from addiction 
and mental health issues struggle to obtain bail, given that they are usually 
required to find a “surety” with great financial assets, and these individuals 
are typically those who do not have the network of such associates who would 
qualify for this purpose.176 By both the legal analysis standards of the U.S. 
and Canada, this is proof that pre-trial bail hearings have a measurable impact 
on the overall trial outcome, and as such should require the presence of pub-
licly appointed counsel. 
These negative repercussions are felt beyond even the individual defend-
ants themselves; there is a greater societal and pecuniary impact as well. De-
spite Canada’s lower-than-ever crime rate, “significant expenditures on crim-
inal justice processes” fall “on the taxpayers’ dime,” including “hundreds of 
millions of dollars [spent] detaining legally innocent people every year.”177 
American studies have also acknowledged how unnecessary incarceration of 
individuals posing no safety threat to the public, but who “simply [are] unable 
to effectively advocate for themselves,” results in needless spending of Amer-
ican taxpayer dollars.178 In addition to pre-trial incarceration spending 
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savings, the availability of lawyers at pre-trial bail hearings would also result 
in effective advocacy for alternative resolution programs, such as deferred 
sentencing, drug courts, or veterans courts, earlier in the prosecution of indi-
gent defendants.179 
The value of publicly appointed lawyers at bail hearings goes beyond num-
bers: In pilot programs implemented in America and Canada, success has been 
found, and continued use of these systems is encouraged within the jurisdic-
tions. In April 2018, the Alberta government made Legal Aid lawyers availa-
ble at all bail hearings.180 Through these efforts, the Alberta government ex-
pressed a desire for their citizens to understand their rights and to reduce 
backlogs holding up their court system.181 In an extension from previous duty 
counsel, who in some jurisdictions are already provided to talk through legal 
issues and proceedings with defendants, including at the bail hearing stage, 
these lawyers will now be able to represent the clients during their actual hear-
ing on the record.182 
As seen in certain Candadian jurisdictions, the presence of duty counsel 
might serve as a low-cost utilitarian solution that American courts could con-
sider implementing a version of. Duty counsel, as mentioned earlier, are avail-
able in certain jurisdictions and provide free limited basic legal consultation 
at certain proceedings, including bail hearings.183 Although full representation 
is not guaranteed, this system allows trained attorneys to talk through impli-
cations of certain proceedings with clients so they have a greater understand-
ing of their criminal prosecutions, and it gives lawyers the chance to empha-
size facts that defendants should try to raise when they present their cases.184   
Ottawa has also made steps toward practical bail reform initiatives, includ-
ing hiring a full-time duty counsel who serves as a bail coordinator in the 
courthouse, assigning a lawyer to detention centers for the purposes of readily 
answering questions, as well as helping facilitate the application for legal aid, 
and adding “bail beds,” which provides housing for low-risk offenders within 
the community while they await their trial.185 
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In the U.S., pilot programs have shown that implementation of mandated 
counsel for the indigent at bail hearings is not only possible, but it is also 
effective. In the mid-1980s, an experiment in Baltimore assigned student law-
yers to certain defendants at bail hearings.186 Those criminal defendants who 
had the advocacy of a law student had an increased chance for a personal re-
cognizance bond and reduced time ultimately spent in jail.187 
The passage of twenty-some years has only shown an increasing proclivity 
to recognize the value of representation by lawyers at bail hearings in certain 
jurisdictions. In 2016, Harris County, Texas, as part of a proposal to the Mac-
Arthur foundation, sought to make lawyers available at probable cause hear-
ings for the mentally ill so that the accused could be diverted to treatment 
programs rather than prison.188 
Multiple counties in Michigan have also taken steps toward providing pub-
licly appointed counsel at bail hearings.189 In Ingham county, data showed that 
“providing counsel at first appearance proceedings is possible and practical, 
so long as adjustments are made to accommodate attorney scheduling con-
flicts.”190 Through the implementation of its First Appearance Project, which 
scheduled public attorneys on shifts so they would be available for all bail 
hearings on a particular day instead of running between courtrooms for dif-
ferent clients they are assigned, major positive breakthroughs were rec-
orded.191 These included reductions in failures to appear, hypothesized to be 
as a result of defendants being less intimidated by the court and therefore more 
likely to come back, as well as a decrease in pre-trial guilty and nolo pleas 
when defendants were represented by counsel.192 
Another version of a bail reform program providing counsel to indigent 
defendants also calls for the setting to change to a more public, community-
oriented venue.193 This suggestion encompasses the traditional role of a law-
yer and the benefits that follow suit while also encouraging including the 
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presentations of mitigating factors by neighborhood members and family in 
these proceedings. This system precludes impositions of financial constraints 
on economically disadvantaged defendants and increases the data collection 
of the disposition of cases amongst other factors, including whether a court-
appointed lawyer was made available or not, and study the correlated effects 
in order to present to Congress for the purposes of scientific, educated legis-
lative reform.194 
 
F. Counter-Arguments Regarding the Practicality of Implementation 
 
In the pilot programs that have been implemented in jurisdictions in both 
countries, there have been growing concerns about the increasingly slow pace 
of dockets, the overburdened case load of publicly appointed counsel (partic-
ularly in rural communities where travel to some court appearances can be a 
four-hour round trip for an attorney), and the lack of a significant impact on 
final case disposition in comparison to extended pre-hearing detention time.195 
Further, there is well-founded fear that beyond stretching the already strained 
public defender system too thin, the mandated presence of counsel at a bail 
hearing would be fiscally impractical since most state budgets need to make 
cut backs, rather than engaging in further expenditures.196 
Beyond logistical and economic concerns of implementing such programs, 
there remains a more deeply-rooted social issue: not everyone believes these 
pre-trial detainees should be released. “Some prosecutors, judges and even 
defenders take the position that detainees are in jail for good reason,” which 
begs consideration of whether the increased burden on the system is worth it, 
and, if such a movement toward increased pre-trial release of potentially vio-
lent and dangerous defendants should be a question of policy left up to tax-
payers funding the system through referendum votes or candidate selection at 
the polls.197 This, perhaps, could be an implicit basis for the United States 
Supreme Court’s constitutional question avoidance. 
Nevertheless, there has been proof in some rural counties implementing 
these programs that pretrial incarceration has at least remained the status quo, 
and for the programs currently developing, there is hope for the creation of 
holistic “compliance plans” that “will be created after thorough coordination 
with the local funding unit, judges, court administrators, and local attorneys 
to determine a model to meet everyone’s needs while working to protect the 
rights of all defendants.”198 
 
 194 Id. 
 195 THE MICH. INDIGENT DEF. COMM’N, supra note 189, at 8-15; Flynn, supra note 188. 
 196 SAPIA, supra note 106, at 2. 
 197 THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., supra note 170, at 36. 
 198 THE MICH. INDIGENT DEF. COMM’N, supra note 189, at 15. 
188 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 48:157 
IV. CONCLUSION 
“In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without 
trial is the carefully limited exception.”199 
In comporting with constitutionally required rights and traditionally 
revered values, both the United States and Canada should find that mandated 
counsel for the indigent at a bail hearing is essential to protecting defendants 
and reshaping broken criminal justice systems. The presence of a lawyer 
makes an empirically dramatic difference since “[e]ven one day in custody 
can cause a person to lose a job, miss school, or be unable to care for depend-
ents.”200 These are definitive harms that cannot be solved through an attor-
ney’s retroactive arguments for lower bail once they are eventually appointed; 
the damage has already been done.  Both American and Canadian jurisdictions 
have taken the necessary steps toward this system through pilot programs and 
incrementally liberalized opinions resulting from related litigation. Our na-
tion’s unique relationship and shared border with Canada provide an ideal in-
cubator for criminal justice reform experimentation, and so in considering 
American movement, the success of our sister nation to the North should be 
thoughtfully considered as well. Therefore, to protect the underlying rights 
constitutionally afforded to criminal defendants in America, and repercussive 
results of rights granted to defendants around the world, the Supreme Court 
of the United States should side with those states whose highest courts have 
affirmed the necessity of counsel presence for the indigent at bail hearings and 
hold that this standard applies in all federal and state courts as well. 
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